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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
that no appeal lies from an order made on a ruling given during
the course of trial,'2 4 it proceeded to discuss the case as if the
merits were before it.
Plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract for the
sale of real property and for damages. At the close of plaintiff's
main case, subject to the calling of an additional witness, defendant
moved to dismiss. Plaintiff then indicated that he would pursue
only the cause for damages. The trial court did not dismiss the
first cause and defendant proceeded with his case. During exam-
ination of his first witness defendant moved for a jury trial of the
second cause. The court ruled that this was not a timely motion
within the meaning of 4103.125
Anwpol provides one of the first illustrations of what will be
deemed a waiver under 4103.
CPLR 4111.: Jury may impeach its own verdict in respect to
misconduct outside jury room.
At common law it was settled that jurors could not by affidavit
impeach their own verdict, even if misconduct outside of the jury
room was involved. 2 , A recent case, Bainton v. The Board of
Education of the City of New York,'2 7 illustrates that the common-
law rule has been eroded. In Bainton, a personal injury action,
two jurors made separate and unauthorized visits to the scene of
the accident. The court held that this highly improper conduct
was so inherently prejudicial as to require a new trial.
The court relied heavily upon the Court of Appeal's decision
in People v. DeLucia,128 which was decided in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Gladden.129  In
DeLucia the Court of Appeals stressed that the purpose of the
common-law rule was to prevent juror harassment but reasoned
that the sixth amendment right to a trial by a fair and impartial
jury must be counterbalanced against the older rationale. The
result of the misconduct in DeLucia, (i.e., several jurors visited the
scene of the crime and re-enacted it), was that these jurors became,
in reality, unsworn witnesses against the defendants in violation of
the sixth amendment.
Since the court in the instant case deemed the visit in and of
itself to be inherently prejudicial, it is arguable that several older
14 See 10 CARMIODY-WArr 21, CycLoPEDIA OF NEv Yoiuc PRAcrIcE
§§70:37, 70:38.
125 Actually, it appeared unlikely that defendant had such right anyway for
the major thrust of the case was in equity. See 4 WEiNsTmN, Koax &
MILLE, Nmv YoRr CvI PRAccicE 114101.37 (1965).
128 People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 111 N.E. 1077 (1916).
27 57 Misc. 2d 140, 292 N.Y.S.2d 229 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1969).
12820 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
12385 U.S. 363 (1966).
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cases which took into account the lack of any subsequent prejudice
are overruled.1 30
ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5203.: Prior unrecorded mortgage has priority over
docketed judgment.
CPLR 5203 allows a judgment creditor to establish a lien on
the judgment debtor's real property by docketing the judgment in
the county of the property's location. A question may then arise
as to whether the docketed judgment has priority over other inter-
ests in the debtor's real property, for example, a prior unrecorded
mortgage.
In Suffolk County Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, v. Geiger,131
defendant, judgment creditor, asserted the superiority of its lien
as a defense against a foreclosing mortgagee. The mortgage
in question had been given after judgment had been rendered in
defendant's favor but before it was docketed. However, the docket-
ing preceded the recording of the mortgage. In deciding for the
mortgagee the court reasoned that a judgment has only such lien
effect as is given it by statute, for at common law judgments were
not liens upon real estate.132 That plaintiff recorded subsequent
to defendant's docketing was of no moment since the rationale
behind the recording act is to protect those who part with value,
i.e., subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, not judgment credit-
ors. 3 3 Thus, while the judgment did not become a lien on the
property until it was docketed, the mortgage became a lien on the
day it was made "as between the parties and against all others
130 Davis v. Lorenzo's, Inc., 258 App. Div. 933, 16 N.Y.S.2d 624 (4th
Dep't 1939) (juror made outside investigation that was deemed harmless);
O'Connor v. Ames Transfer Co., 187 N.Y.S. 111 (Sup. Ct Kings County
1931), aff'd, 200 App. Div. 845, 191 N.Y.S. 941 (2d Dep't 1932); Haight
v. City of Elmira, 42 App. Div. 391, 59 N.Y.S. 193 (3d Dep't 1899)
(jurors visited scene of accident after snow and ice had melted, unlike
conditions at time of accident).
13 57 Misc. 2d 184, 291 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1968).
1See H.R. & C. Co. v. Smith, 242 N.Y. 267, 269, 151 N.E. 448, 449
(1926); Atlas Refining Co. v. Smith, 52 App. Div. 109, 64 N.Y.S. 1044
(4th Dep't 1900).
13 Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Berberich, 24 App. Div. 2d 187, 264
N.Y.S.2d 989 (3d Dep't 1965); Blum v. Krampner, 28 N.Y.S2d 62
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 989, 27 N.Y.S.2d 1000
(2d Dep't 1941). In R.P.L. §290 "[t]he term 'purchaser' includes every
person to whom any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a
valuable consideration, and every assignee of a mortgage, lease or other con-
ditional estate." R.P.L. §291 states that "[e]very such conveyance not so
recorded is void as against any person who subsequently purchases or ac-
quired by exchange or contracts to purchase or acquires by exchange. .. "
[ VOL.. 43
